Passive Defense
Written By: Major Mike “Woody” Woodhouse. MAJ Woodhouse is an Air Defense Artillery Officer serving as the Air Defense Chief Planner at NATO Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in the United Kingdom.
“Everyone’s bad at air defense”, this was the phrase echoed several times during a warfighting conference held in preparation for Exercise DEFENDER EUROPE 2020. As a career-long air and missile defense officer this was troubling to hear, although under the context that this phrase was uttered one could not disagree. When comparing U.S. air defense systems in a post-Cold War era versus offensive systems of a near peer adversary the “system-vs-system” math is not favorable to the home team. However, when looking at air defense through the lens of other operational elements such as passive defense there is more hope.
On 8 January 2020, a military operation code named Operation Martyr Soleimani saw the launching of numerous ballistic missiles from Iran into U.S. occupied bases in Iraq. Although, no active air defense systems neutralized the threat, zero U.S. troops were killed. This was because a combination of passive air defense measures to include early warning, dispersion and hardening saved these soldiers’ lives. Air defense is not the sole responsibility of the professional air defender. Commanders at all echelons, across all components, must take intoaccount enemy capabilities and understand what can be executed tactically in order to minimize the effectiveness of aerial attack.
When it comes to acquisition of Army capability, choose two of the three options: Good, Fast, Cheap. This notion rings true when it comes to the sophisticated weapon systems of the future. As the U.S. Army continues to innovate and compete with threats across all domains, it is imperative to stay cognizant of what the “Fight Tonight” scenario looks like. Given today’s air defense capability shortfalls, passive defense can mitigate risk. It will take time for the Army to modernize its air defense force from maneuver short range systems and indirect fire protection capability to the operational level Patriot and THAAD systems we have come to know and love. Likewise, as the Army enhances sensors and shooters and introduces systems such asintegrated battle command system (IBCS) to enable integration across the battlefield, it will also take time incorporating change across the DOTMLPF-P construct. Therefore, strong passive defense measures now will enable effective air defense in the interim of timely modernization initiatives.
Some would argue that the days of noise and light discipline and camouflage covered tents are behind us. With technology transcending across militaries, the ability to find fix and strike appears to be more exquisite and hence negates past tactics, techniques, and procedures like camouflage and concealment. However, looking at disciplined use of cyber networks, masking electromagnetic signatures, emission control and our responses associated with, for instance air raid warnings, focus on passive defense is relevant to a modern conflict. In order to enable the mission command philosophy and leaders’ ability to respond dynamically, we must continue to have deliberate plans and deliberate rehearsals taking into account all passive defense measures available.
So is everyone bad at air defense? The answer may not be a simple “yes “or “no.” It requires one to think about what good air defense looks like. If that can be defined as minimizing detection while maximizing protection and enabling mission command, then incorporating a strong passive defense continues to be a must in today’s fight.
